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COMMENTS
SECURITIES FRAUD UNDER
THE BLUE SKY OF WASHINGTON
In the past, federal courts have been the primary forums for securities fraud litigation because they exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 and have expansively interpreted the antifraud provisions of that Act.2 Recent devel1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Exclusive jurisdiction is provided by § 78aa. In contrast, state courts have jurisdictiQn over common law actions
and claims brought under their respective state securities acts, and both state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction under § 77v over claims brought under the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (West 1971 & Supp. 1977).
When a securities fraud claim is brought under the 1934 Act, federal courts may extend pendent jurisdiction to additional claims arising under state securities laws and
actions for common law fraud or negligent misrepresentation. See, e.g., Smith v.
Manausa, 535 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1976); Kennedy v. Tallant, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH)
71,311 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 22, 1976); Architectural League v. Bartos, 404 F.
Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But see Kerby v. Commodity Resources Inc., 395 F. Supp.
786 (D. Colo. 1975). The power of the federal courts to exercise pendent jurisdiction
over claims for which there is no independent jurisdiction is discretionary. United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). However, if the nonfederal claim arises out
of the same nucleus of operative fact or is an alternative theory upon which liability
may be based, the court will usually consider it. The test is whether both federal and
state claims would ordinarily be tried together and whether it is fair and convenient to
both parties and to the court. United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 725-26.
2. The pertinent antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1970 & Supp. V 1975), include. § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1970), quoted in part at note 18 infra, and § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970) (requiring
full disclosure of material facts in proxies). Despite additional antifraud provisions in
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77k, 771(2), 77q(a) (West 1971 & Supp.
1977), rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977), promulgated pursuant to § 10(b)
of the 1934 Act, has come to dominate the field of securities fraud litigation. See 1
A. BROMBERG, SECURI-IES LAW: FRAUD, § 2.5, at 41, 45-46 (1977). For a discussion

of the rising importance of § 10(b) and rule lob-5 in securities fraud litigation, see 3
L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1763-97 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id. at 3869-925 (Supp.
1969).
Even securities and transactions which are exempt from the registration provisions
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77c, 77d (West 1971 & Supp. 1977), are covered by
§ 10(b) and rule lOb-5. E.g., Sohns v. Dahl, 392 F. Supp. 1208, 1218-19 (W.D. Va.
1975); accord, SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 1327, 1333
(W.D. Tenn. 1973) (although municipal bonds are exempt from registration, the antifraud provisions apply). Furthermore, in order for federal jurisdiction to attach, it is
necessary only that the claim involve a transaction using "any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange." 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). Because almost all securities transactions do meet
these criteria, actions will usually lie under § 10(b). Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd in part on rehearing, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.)
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opments, however, suggest that state courts may provide a more attractive forum for plaintiffs seeking relief from securities fraud in
Washington. Relevant considerations include recent United States Supreme Court decisions limiting the scope of civil liability under the
1934 Act, 3 increasing congestion and delay in federal courts, recent
amendments expanding the coverage of the civil liability provision of
the Securities Act of Washington, 4 and supplemental common law
remedies available in state courts.5 This comment will discuss the often-overlooked alternative of bringing a private civil action for securities fraud in a state court under the antifraud provision of the Securi-

(en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
The history of civil litigation under rule l0b-5 is well documented and beyond the
scope of this comment. See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra at § 2.2(460); 3 L. Loss, supra at
1763-97. See also Note, Rule lob-5 Damages: The Runaway Development of a Common Law Remedy, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 76 (1975). Although § 10(b) does not expressly provide for private civil remedies, beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), lower federal courts have repeatedly held that
civil liability may be implied for violations of this section. Recent United States Supreme Court cases likewise have acknowledged the existence of a private cause of action for violations of § 10(b). E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196
(1976) ("existence of a private cause of action . . . is now well-established") (citing
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971)).
3. Recent cases dealing with § 10(b) include Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97
S. Ct. 1292 (1977) (no cause of action is stated under § 10(b) absent an allegation
of manipulation or deception), Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(scienter is a necessary element in an action under § 10(b)), and Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only purchasers and sellers have standing
to sue under § 10(b)). Recent cases dealing with § 14 include Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977) (no implied private right of action exists under
§ 14(e)), and TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (a fact is
material if it would be considered important in deciding how to vote a proxy).
For a discussion of the changing Supreme Court interpretation of federal securities
laws in private actions, see Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under The
Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. LJ. 891 (1977); Note,
JudicialRetrenchment Under Rule 10b-5: An End to the Rule as Law?, 1976 DUKE LJ.
789; 1976 Wis. L. REv. 256.
4. The Securities Act Amendments of 1977, ch. 172, § 4, 1977 Wash. Laws 672,
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430 (Supp. 1977)) amended this civil liability
provision of the Securities Act of Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 21.20 (1976), to
include express liability for violations of R.C.W. § 21.20.010 and to extend the period
of time within which an action for violation of that section may be filed from three
years "after the contract of sale" to three years from the date of discovery of the
violation. Previously, R.C.W. § 21.20.430 had been amended to add subsection (2)
providing for express liability for purchasers as well as sellers. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, ch. 84, § 24, 1975 Wash. Laws 371.
5. Washington courts recognize both an action for common law fraud and an
action for negligent misrepresentation. See Brown v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 53 Wn. 2d
142, 153-54, 332 P.2d 228, 234-35 (1958) (negligent misrepresentation and common
law fraud are two separate and distinct causes of action in Washington).
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ties Act of Washington, 6 or common law theories of fraud7 or
negligent misrepresentation. 8
6. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010 (1976), quoted at note 16 infra. The Washington
Act contains two other antifraud provisions, which are beyond the scope of this comment. R.C.W. § 21.20.020, modeled after § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(l) to (2) (1970), creates liability for fraud and deceit on
the part of investment advisors; R.C.W. § 21.20.350 makes it unlawful to file materially false or misleading documents with the state securities director. Because no
provisions now exist under R.C.W. § 21.20.430 for civil liability as a result of violations of these sections, securities investors must bring a common law action for fraud
or negligent misrepresentation or assert an implied cause of action under the statute.
See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1661-69; 6 id. at 3808-16 (Supp. 1969).
Under § 410(h) of the Uniform Securities Act, upon which the Washington Act
was modeled, private rights and remedies are specifically limited to those contained in
the express civil liability provision. The purpose of this limitation is to prevent state
courts from implying a private cause of action, as happened under § 10(b) of the
1934 Act. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(h), Commissioners' Note. In adopting its
version of the Uniform Securities Act, the Washington legislature, along with those of
a number of other states, specifically omitted this provision of § 410(h), thereby declining to rule out implied causes of action under the Washington Act. 1-3 BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) (Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Virginia, & Wisconsin).
See Note, Express and Implied Civil Liability Provisions in State Blue Sky Laws,
17 W. RES. L. REV. 1173, 1193-94 (1966). See also Abrahamson v. Fleschner, [19761977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,889 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 1977)
(an implied right of action exists under § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970), and the absence of the words "in connection with a purchase
or sale" indicates that a purchase or sale is not required); Note, Private Causes of
Action Under Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 74 MICH. L. REV. 308 (1975).
Prior to the 1975 amendment creating an express cause of action for purchasers,
see note 4 supra, the Washington Court of Appeals had held that a cause of action
could be implied under R.C.W. § 21.20.010. Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wn. App. 845, 472
P.2d 589 (1970). In Ludwig v. Mutual Real Estate Investors, 18 Wn. App. 33, 567
P.2d 658 (1977), the court noted that its decision to permit an implied cause of action
in Shermer "was a response to the legislature's failure to provide a statutory damage
remedy against a purchaserof securities while providing such a cause of action against
a seller." Id. at 42, 567 P.2d at 663 (emphasis in original). This indicates that the
court may be willing to imply causes of action under R.C.W. 99 21.20.020 & .350
for which there are presently no statutory damage remedies.
It should be noted that the legislature apparently failed to recognize the need to
include these sections in its 1977 amendment to the civil liability provision. By deleting
the words "fraud or misrepresentation" and substituting a specific reference only to
R.C.W. § 21.20.010, it eliminated express civil liability for violations of R.C.W.
§ 21.20.020 & .350. See WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(l)-(2) (Supp. 1977).
7. Turner v. Enders, 15 Wn. App. 875, 552 P.2d 694 (1976) (defrauded securities
investors brought an action for common law fraud); cf. Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d
447, 454 (9th Cir. 1956) (defrauded securities investor may bring an action for common law fraud in state court because federal securities laws merely create an additional remedy).
8. Cf.J & J Food Centers, Inc. v. Selig, 76 Wn. 2d 304, 456 P.2d 691 (1969) (false
statements regarding a lease deposit and made to induce a sale constitute actionable
negligence); Brown v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 53 Wn. 2d 142, 332 P.2d 228 (1958)
(false statements by a real estate broker, although not fraudulent, may be negligent
and therefore actionable).
Actions for negligent misrepresentation in Washington have arisen mainly in connection with sales of real property; nevertheless, the analysis appears equally applicable
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THE SECURITIES ACT OF WASHINGTON

Modeled after the Uniform Securities Act,9 the Washington Act is
aimed at protecting investors and facilitating the smooth operation of
local financial markets. 10 Its provisions (1) prohibit fraud, or the misrepresentation or omission of a material fact;" (2) require the licensing
of brokers, dealers, and investment advisors; 12 (3) provide for the registration of securities to be traded; 13 and (4) create remedies for violations of the Act. 14 In addition, the Washington Act contains a specific
directive that it be construed so as "to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it and to coordinate [its] interpretation and
5
administration... with the related federal regulation."'
The general antifraud provision in the Washington Act, R.C.W. §
21.20.010,16 is modeled after SEC rule lOb-5, 7 which was promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
to securities transactions. See Swanson v. Solomon, 50 Wn. 2d 825, 828, 314 P.2d 655,
657 (1957) (same elements are necessary to establish fraud in sale of personal property as in sale of real property).
9. The Uniform Securities Act was approved in 1956 by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by the A.B.A. See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT, Historical Note, 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 691 (1970). Presently, 33 states, Puerto
Rico, and the District of Columbia have adopted the Uniform Act in some form.
1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 4901, at 701-02. The remaining states have blue sky laws
with widely varying provisions. "Diversity of approach is still the rule in states which
have not adopted the Uniform Act." Rooks, The Blue Sky of Washington: Registration
of Securities of a New Venture, 6 GONZ. L. REV. 187, 190 (1971). See generally
L. Loss & E. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW (1958); J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON
NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS (1971).

10. Unlike the federal securities laws, whose purpose is to provide disclosure,
state blue sky laws have served as a mechanism to rule on the merits of new offerings.
See J. MOFSKY, supra note 9, at 15-17; Rooks, supra note 9, at 188. See generally
Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements?, 1976 WIs. L.
REv. 79; Hueni, Application of Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulation,
15 WAYNE L. REV. 1417 (1969); Mofsky & Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation,
60 MARQ. L. REV. 367 (1977). For an example of one state's attempt to implement
the merit approach by express statutory provision, see CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140
(West 1977).
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010 (1976). The Washington Act contains an additional antifraud provision applying to the actions of investment advisors, id. § 21.20.020,
and a section prohibiting materially false or misleading statements in documents filed
with the state securities division, id. § 21.20.350. See note 6 supra.
12. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 21.20.040-.135 (1976).
13. Id. §§ 21.20.140-.325 (1976 & Supp. 1977). Section 21.20.310 was amended
twice during the 1977 legislative session. For the applicable rule of statutory construction, see WASH. REV. CODE § 1.12.025 (1976).
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.390 (1976) (injunctions); id. § 21.20.400 (criminal
liability); id. § 21.20.430 (Supp. 1977) (civil liability).
15. Id. § 21.20.900 (1976) (modeled after § 415 of the Uniform Securities Act).
16. Id. § 21.20.010. This section states:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly:
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1934.18 Unlike the federal statute, however, the Washington Act contains an additional section, R.C.W. § 21.20.430,19 creating express

civil liability for violations of this antifraud provision.
A.

Civil Liability

The civil liability provision in the Washington Act, R.C.W. §
21
21.20.430, designates the persons liable, 2 0 the standards of care,
2
2
and the measure of damages available under the Act. It provides for
costs, interest, and attorneys' fees, and specifies a statute of limitations
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to- omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). Pursuant to the power granted it by § 10(b),
in 1942 the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated rule lOb-5, which is
substantially identical to R.C.W. § 21.20.010, quoted at note 16 supra, except for an
interstate commerce requirement necessary for federal jurisdiction. The language of
rule lOb-5 was patterned after § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (1970), the major difference being the inclusion of purchaser liability under
§ 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). This section makes it unlawful for any person
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national security exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
19.

WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430 (Supp. 1977).

20. In addition to primary liability for purchasers, sellers, and offerors, id.
§ 21.20.430(l)-(2), third-party liability extends to all officers, directors, and controlling persons, as well as employees and other persons who materially aid in the trans*action. Id. § 21.20.430(3).
21. Subsection 21.20.430(3) creates a negligence standard for third parties, but
imposes strict liability upon purchasers, sellers, and offerors. See text accompanying
note 88 infra. In order for third parties to be held liable, however, there must be primary liability under R.C.W. § 21.20.430(1) or (2). Ludwig v. Mutual Real Estate
Investors, 18 Wn. App. 33, 42, 567 P.2d 658, 662 (1977); accord, Nikkel v. Stifel,
Nicolaus & Co., 542 P.2d 1305 (Okla. 1975) (construing Oklahoma Securities Act
provision). See also Mitchell v. Beard, 513 S.W.2d 905 (Ark. 1974) (partner need
not have materially aided in sale to be held civilly liable under the Arkansas Securities Act).
22. The only remedy provided under R.C.W. § 21.20.430 is rescission. See Garretson v. Red-Co, Inc., 9 Wn. App. 923, 928-29, 516 P.2d 1039, 1042-43 (1973); accord,
B & T Distribs., Inc. v. Riehle, 359 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. App.) (interpreting a similar
provision in Indiana law), rev'd on other grounds,366 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1977).
In Turner v. Enders, 15 Wn. App. 875, 552 P.2d 694 (1976), two employees were
defrauded in the purchase of a 40% interest in a mobile home sales business. Because
they wished to retain their stock and sue for damages rather than rescission, they
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similar to that applicable to actions for common law fraud. 23 Prior to
its amendment in 1977, this section contained no express reference to
R.C.W. § 21.20.010, but imposed civil liability upon any person who
offered, sold, or purchased a security "by means of fraud or misrepresentation. 2 4 It was unclear under this language whether all violations
of R.C.W. § 21.20.010 were covered by the phrase "fraud or misrepresentation" and thereby within the scope of R.C.W. § 21.20.430.25
This uncertainty has been clarified by the 1977 amendment, which
provides that all violations of R.C.W. § 21.20.010 create civil liability under the Act.
B.

Transactions Covered
An initial requirement for bringing a claim under the Washington

brought an action for common law fraud rather than an action under the antifraud
provision of the Washington Act. But see Chester v. McDaniel, 264 Or. 303, 504 P.2d
726 (1972) (Oregon Supreme Court permitted a claim for damages under a similar
provision in the Oregon Securities Act).
23. The statute of limitations for common law fraud is three years from the date
of discovery of the fraud. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.080(4) (1976). Prior to the 1977
amendment to the Washington Act, the statute of limitations under R.C.W. § 21.20.430
was three years from the date of the transaction. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430 (1976)
(amended 1977).
24. This prior version of R.C.W. § 21.20.430 differed from the corresponding
Uniform Securities Act civil liability provision, § 4 10(a), which states:
Any person who
(2) offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission), and who
does not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonablecare could not have known, of the untruth or omission,
is liable . ...
UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(a) (emphasis added). The corresponding provision in
the Washington Act as originally proposed was identical to § 410(a) until amended
by the House before final passage when the words "fraud or misrepresentation" were
substituted for the words quoted in italics above. 1959 House Journal 1038 (amending
S.S.B. 52, 36th Legis., § 43). In the absence of legislative history, the purpose of this
change is difficult to determine. The recent amendment to this section, striking the
words "fraud or misrepresentation" and substituting a specific reference to R.C.W.
§ 21.20.010, should clarify the legislative intent. See note 4 supra. But see note 6
supra.
25. In Ludwig v. Mutual Real Estate Investors, 18 Wn. App. 33, 567 P.2d 658
(1977), a limited partner in a mutual real estate fund brought an action to recover
her investment. The trial court found that the defendant, who was the principal owner
of the corporate general partner, had violated R.C.W. § 21.20.010. On appeal, the
court held that under the version of R.C.W. § 21.20.430 then in force, a violation
of R.C.W. § 21.20.010 was not enough to establish civil liability. It was also necessary
to show fraud or misrepresentation and an element of intent before civil liability
would arise. 18 Wn. App. at 39-42, 567 P.2d at 661-62.
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Act is that the challenged transaction involve a security. 2 6 The Act
contains a lengthy definition of "security,"27 modeled after the definitions in the Uniform Securities Act 28 and in federal securities legislation. 29 Included in these definitions are such terms as "notes,"
"stocks," "bonds," "debentures," and "investment contracts," only
some of which have clear and unambiguous meanings. Courts have
had by far the most difficulty determining what constitutes an investment contract, and the inclusion of investment contracts within the
statutory definition of a security has led to substantial problems of interpretation.

Determining whether specific money-making ventures involve the
sale of investment contracts has been a recurrent subject of administrative rulings and litigation in federal and state courts.3 0 The established Howey test 3 l defines an investment contract as a security if
money has been invested in a common enterprise with the expectation
of profits to come solely from the efforts of others. 3 2 In recent years,
however, some federal and state courts have concluded that the broad

protective purpose of securities legislation requires a more flexible
standard.3 3 As a result, they have developed a "risk capital" ap26. See WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010 (1976).
27. Id. § 21.20.005(12) (Supp. 1977).
28. The Uniform Securities Act defines a security in language identical to R.C.W.
§ 21.20.005(12), except for the additional provision in the Washington Act to include
out-of-state land sales. See UNIFORM SECuRrIEs AcT § 401(1).
29. Compare Securities Act of 1933, § 2(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970), and
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970), with
WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.005(12) (Supp. 1977). In State v. Williams, 17 Wn. App. 368,
370-71, 563 P.2d 1270, 1271 (1977), the court commented that the definition of a
security in the Washington Act "is substantially identical to the definition of a security
in the federal Securities Act of 1933." Accord, Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co.,
409 F.2d 635, 641 (9th Cir. 1969) (interpreting the Washington Act definition of a
security).
30. See, e.g., State v. Vacation Internationale, Ltd., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
71,294 (Alas. Adm'r of Sec., May 27, 1976) (time-sharing condominium units construed as investment contracts); In re Camp Dells Recreational Park, 3 BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH)
71,249 (Wis. Comm'r of Sec., Oct. 10, 1975) (perpetual memberships in recreational park corporation are securities); Kemmerer v. Weaver, 445 F.2d
76 (7th Cir. 1971) (contracts for sale, care, and resale of breeding beaver held to be
investment contracts); Hurst v. Dare To Be Great, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
71,012 (D.C. Ore. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1973) (pyramid promotional scheme held to be the sale of investment contracts); Kleiner v. Silver, 137 Ga.
App. 560, 224 S.E.2d 508 (1976) (limited partnership shares held to be investment
contracts); State v. Williams, 17 Wn. App. 368, 563 P.2d 1270 (1977) (interest in
patent royalties held to be securities).
31. SECv. WJ.Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
32. Id. at 298-99. For a discussion of the Howey test and related cases, see I L.
Loss, supra note 2, at 483-511; 4 id. at 2500-57 (Supp. 1969).
33. E.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ent., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.),
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proach, 34 which relaxes two of the Howey requirements-that profits be
expected from the investment and that these profits derive solely from
the efforts of others. 35 This new approach allows the investor to participate and requires merely that risk capital be supplied with a reasonable expectation of a valuable benefit, but without the right to
36
exercise control over the enterprise.
The "risk capital" approach has been adopted as a modification of
the Howey test by the courts of neighboring states 37 and by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit when interpreting federal securities
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); cf. State v. Williams, 17 Wn. App. 368, 371, 563
P.2d 1270-72 (1977) (need for protection through disclosure is the dominant purpose
of federal and Washington securities laws). See generally Comment, The Definition of
a Security Under the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968: The Risk Capital
Test, 6 PAC. L.J. 683, 686 (1975).
34. This approach was first used by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills
Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961)
(sale of club memberships to raise capital for business venture held to be investment
contracts). See generally Regan, Securities Regulations: When is a Club Membership
a Security?, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 356 (1977).
35. For example, both the sale of promotional memberships and pyramid sales
schemes have been held to be investment contracts in spite of their failure to meet the
Howey test. See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906,
13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961) (promotional memberships); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ent.,
Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (pyramid sales
scheme). For a further discussion of what may be found to constitute a security, see
Matsen & Whitesides, The Basic Securities Law and Tax Aspects of Private Limited
Partnership Offerings in California, 4 W. ST. U.L. REV. 199, 200-14 (1977); Comment, Bank Loan Participations as Securities: Notes, Investment Contracts, and the
Commercialllnvestment Dichotomy, 15 Duo. L. REV. 261 (1976-77); 5 FORDHAM
URB. L.i. 591 (1977) (employee pension funds as securities).
36. The Hawaii Supreme Court used the "risk capital" approach in holding that
an investment contract is created if:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises or
representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable
benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree
as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control
over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105, 109 (1971).
37. The "risk capital" approach has been adopted by courts in California, Hawaii,
Idaho, and Oregon. See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811,
361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Haw.
642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); State v. Glenn W. Turner Ent., Inc., Civ. No. 47773,
(Dist. Ct., 4th Judicial Dist. Idaho, Mar. 28, 1972) (mem.); Pratt v. Kross, 276 Or.
483, 555 P.2d 765 (1976). In addition, the Alaska legislature recently amended the
definition of a security in its securities act to adopt the "risk capital" approach. ALASKA
STAT. § 45.55.130(12) (Supp. 1976). Cf. King Commodity Co. v. State, 508 S.W.2d
439, 444 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) (suggesting that even under Howey, "absolute nonparticipation of the investor" may not be essential) (citing State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center,
Inc., 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971)).
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legislation. 38 Because the Washington Act contains a specific directive
that it be construed in coordination with related state and federal legislation, 39 it is likely that the "risk capital" approach will be adopted
40
in Washington as well.

Once it has been determined that the disputed transaction involved
a security, the Act does not require a special form of transaction or
one in which only securities are involved. 41 Purchases and sales need
not be made through an impersonal market, 42 and even if certain securities are exempt from the registration requirements of the Act, they

are still covered by its antifraud provisions. 43
C.

Standing
R.C.W. § 21.20.010 requires that the defendant's conduct occur

38. See, e.g., Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1256-57 & n.2
(9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (corporate note not a security because restrictions
placed on corporation by bank minimized risk); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ent., Inc.,
474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (profits need not
come solely from the efforts of others). In a recent Supreme Court case, United Hous.
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Court left open the issue of
the adoption of the "risk capital" approach under federal securities law. But see SEC
Release No. 5211, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,446
("risk capital" approach applies in actions under federal securities acts).
39. WASH.REV. CODE § 21.20.900 (1976).
40. In fact, lower Washington courts have applied the "risk capital" approach.
E.g., Lundquist v. American Campgrounds, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,196
(King County Super. Ct., Oct. 30, 1973) (Judge Warren Chan applied "risk capital"
approach in holding a pyramid sales scheme of campground memberships to be the
sale of investment contracts in spite of plaintiff's participation in the scheme). But see
State v. Williams, 17 Wn. App. 368, 371, 563 P.2d 1270, 1271-72 (1977), in which
the court used the Howey test in holding that patent and royalty interests were securities. However, the need to use the "risk capital" approach did not arise and was not
at issue in Williams.
41. Cf. Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) (transaction involving
exchange of stock for an interest in real property is covered by § 10(b)).
42. In Clausing v. DeHart, 83 Wn. 2d 70, 515 P.2d 982 (1973), the Washington
Supreme Court held that "RCW 21.20.010 is applicable to 'face to face' negotiations
outside the security markets between private individuals for the sale of the capital
stock of a corporation." Id. at 73, 515 P.2d at 984.
43. Even though a transaction may involve a security, either the security or the
transaction may be exempt from the registration requirements of the Washington Act
under R.C.W. §9 21.20.310 & .320. Nevertheless, the antifraud provision still applies.
L. Loss & E. CowETT, BLUE SKY LAW 25 (1958); UNIFORM SECURITIEs ACT § 402(a),

Commissioners Note. See Clausing v. DeHart, 83 Wn. 2d 70, 73 n.1, 515 P.2d 982,
984 n.1 (1973); cf. B & T Distribs., Inc. v. Riehle, 359 N.E.2d 622, 624 (Ind. App.)
(Indiana law), rev'd on other grounds, 366 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1977); Chester v.
McDaniel, 264 Or. 303, 504 P.2d 726, 728 (1972) (Oregon law). Three state securities acts specifically note that their fraud provisions apply whether or not a security
is exempt from the registration provisions. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 881(1)(B)
(West Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1644(B) (Cum. Supp. 1976); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(2) (Vernon 1964).
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"in connection with" a purchase or sale in order to be actionable. This
requirement is somewhat vague and has not been interpreted by a
Washington court. The United States Supreme Court, however, interpreting similar wording in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, has held that
the words "in connection with" must be read flexibly. 44 Thus, the defendant's acts need not relate to the quality of the security, 45 but may
involve misrepresenting the value of the consideration offered in exchange for the security. 46 The statutory directive to interpret the
Washington Act in coordination with federal securities law 47 supports
a similar reading of R.C.W. § 21.20.010.
It is still necessary, however, for the plaintiff to be a purchaser or
seller rather than a mere offeree in order to have standing to sue under R.C.W. § 21.20.010. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,48 a case brought under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5, the United
States Supreme Court considered a claim by offerees who were persuaded by an overly pessimistic prospectus not to purchase any
shares. In affirming the dismissal of the complaint, the Court applied
the rule initially formulated by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,49 and held that only actual purchasers and sellers may bring a claim for damages under section 10(b). 50 Under the civil liability provision in the Washington Act,
such a restriction on the class of plaintiffs is expressly stated,5 1 indicating that potential purchasers and sellers are not within the class of
52
persons entitled to civil remedies under this section.
44. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
45. See, e.g., Glickman v. Schweickart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670, 674 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (alleged misrepresentation relating to the financing of a securities purchase is
actionable under § 10(b)).
46. In Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956), defendant exchanged
real property for securities. Even though the fraudulent act involved misrepresenting
the value of the real property and not the securities, § 10(b) was held to apply.
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.900 (1976).
48. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
49. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The Birnbaum rule
has been the subject of extensive commentary. See generally Boone & McGowan,
Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 TEX. L. REv. 617 (1971); Lowenfels,
The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REV.
268 (1968); Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 ALA. L. REV. 543
(1971).
50. 421 U.S. at 754-55.
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(l)-(2) (Supp. 1977).
52. Injured parties, who are not purchasers or sellers and therefore not covered by
the provisions of R.C.W. § 21.20.430, may be able to assert an implied cause of action
under R.C.W. § 21.20.020 (investment advisors) or R.C.W. § 21.20.350 (filing mis-
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D.

Causation

Claims brought under the antifraud and civil liability provisions of
the Washington Act require a showing that the acts of the defendant
in fact caused the loss the plaintiff has suffered. 53 Under the civil
liability provision, R.C.W. § 21.20.430, a purchaser is limited to a

remedy of rescission and must tender the security in exchange for a
return of the consideration paid.54 Similarly, a seller must tender the
55
consideration received in exchange for a return of the security sold.
Because the plaintiff's statutory remedy is rescission of the transac-

tion, it is sufficient to establish transaction causation 56 by showing
that the misrepresentation or omission involved a material fact and

that the plaintiff justifiably relied upon it to her detriment in deciding
57
whether to purchase or sell.

1.

Materiality

In Washington, a material fact has consistently been defined as "a
fact to which a reasonable man would attach importance in determin-

ing his choice of action in the transaction in question." 58 Because a

leading documents). See note 6 supra. Because these sections do not contain the words
"in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security," no purchase or sale is
required.
53.

54.

Cf. 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, at § 8.7 (discussing rule lOb-5).
WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(1) (Supp. 1977). In Garretson v. Red-Co, Inc.,

9 Wn. App. 923, 516 P.2d 1039 (1973), an action was brought under R.C.W. § 21.20.430(l) for failure to register nonexempt securities. In permitting rescission, the court
commented that "there is no liability for an illegal or fraudulent sale under this statute
where the buyer chooses to retain the stock." 9 Wn. App. at 928, 516 P.2d at 1042.
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(2) (Supp. 1977). This subsection on seller's
remedies was added by the 1975 amendment. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, ch.
84, § 24, 1975 Wash. Laws 371. Apparently inadvertently, the amendment failed to
require that the seller return the consideration received in exchange for the security
recovered. This oversight was corrected by the 1977 amendment.
56. Cf. 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 8.7(1), at 216 (discussing rule lOb-5).
57. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1626-27; 6 id. at 3784 (Supp. 1969).
58. Clausing v. DeHart, 83 Wn. 2d 70, 73, 515 P.2d 982, 984 (1973) (quoting
Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wn. App. 845, 855, 472 P.2d 589, 595 (1970)). This definition is
in accord with federal case law. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), however, the Supreme Court broadened
the materiality standard under § 10(b) to include facts which "a reasonable investor
might have considered" important. Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added). In TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), a case of securities fraud involving a
proxy and brought under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, the Court retreated from its holding in Affiliated Ute by stating that "[a] n omitted fact is material if there is a sub-
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prerequisite to materiality is the misrepresentation or omission of an
existing fact, promises and opinions of the defendant concerning a future event generally are excluded from this definition.5 9 Materiality is
an objective standard, based upon a reasonable investor's skills, and is
60
not affected by the expertise of the plaintiff.
2.

Reliance

Unlike the objective standard of materiality, reliance involves a
subjective determination, 6 1 and the standard will vary depending
upon the expertise of the plaintiff.6 2 Decisions by federal courts under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act have indicated a limited relaxation of
63
the reliance requirement. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that in the case of a fraudulent omission, reliance could be presumed. 6 4 In subsequent cases brought under section
10(b), relaxation of the reliance requirement has turned upon factual
distinctions. 65 Generally, if fraud or misrepresentation occurs in a
stantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote." Id. at 449 (emphasis added). Whether TSC signals a retreat from the
Court's position in Affiliated Ute in § 10(b) cases remains unclear, but it appears
likely given the similar interpretation of materiality in § 10(b) and § 14(a) actions.
59. See, e.g., Shook v. Scott, 56 Wn. 2d 351, 356-59, 353 P.2d 431, 433-44 (1960)
(materiality in a common law fraud action); cf. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 109
(4th ed. 1971) (under certain circumstances, promises and opinions may be actionable).
60. Cf. 3 A. BROMBERO, supra note 2, § 8.3, at 199 (discussing rule lOb-5). For
a further discussion of materiality under § 10(b) and § 14(a), see Hewitt, Developing
Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW. 887 (1977); 18 B. C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REV. 349 (1977).
61. See 3 A. BROMBERO, supra note 2, § 8.6, at 209-12; Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 602-06
(1975).
62. Some federal courts have held that it is an affirmative defense that the plaintiff's
reliance was not reasonable and that he failed to exercise due diligence in investigating
the transaction. E.g., Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409-10 (3d Cir. 1974).
Although the specific facts in each case will usually control the result, courts have
generally held insiders and sophisticated investors to a higher standard of care than
the general public. See Note, The Due Diligence Requirement for Plaintiffs Under
Rule 10b-5, 1975 DUKE L.J. 753, 762-70; Note, supra note 61, at 602-06; cf.
S & F Supply Co. v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (Utah 1974) (purchaser plaintiff, a stockbroker, not entitled to rescission when no false representations were made to him and
he failed to exercise reasonable care based on his knowledge and experience). But cf.
Washington Nat'l Corp. v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 1268, 1275 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
(contributory negligence not a defense as statute "imposes an affirmative duty not to
mislead").
63. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
64. Id. at 154.
65. E.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905-08 (9th Cir. 1975) (in a stock
exchange transaction materiality is enough, reliance not required); Carras v. Burns,
516 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975) (rebuttable inference of reliance exists when a
broker misrepresents a material fact); Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974),
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face-to-face transaction, reliance is still required. If the complaint alleges nondisclosure in a marketplace transaction or in one involving a
large group of investors, however, the problems of proof necessitate
66
that reliance be presumed.
In contrast, under the antifraud provision in the Washington Act it
is still necessary to allege and prove actual reliance. In Shermer v.
Baker,6 7 in which an unsophisticated seller was defrauded in a faceto-face transaction, the Washington Court of Appeals held that actual
reliance must be shown. 68 In Clausing v. DeHart,69 the Washington
Supreme Court disregarded contractual recitals of reliance by the
plaintiff and reinforced the requirement that actual reliance be established. Denying rescission, the court commented that the actual impact of a statement or omission is the primary concern when the equitable powers of the court are involved.7 0 The existence of a remedy of
rescission under the Washington Act may explain the court's
unwillingness to relax the reliance requirement; rescission is an equi-

table remedy which is not granted lightly by the courts. In the future,
however, Washington courts may recognize presumed reliance when
faced with cases involving the factual distinctions drawn by federal
courts under section 10(b).
E.

Scienter

Under the 1976 United States Supreme Court decision in Ernst &
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) (some degree of reliance or causation in fact is
required); Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (when investor's contact with broker is "virtually non-existent," reliance is required); Hawk
Indus., Inc. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 619, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (in class
action, individual reliance on the part of each class member need not be shown,
therefore class action appropriate).
66. See generally Stoll, Reliance as an Element in l0b-5 Actions, 53 ORE. L. REV.
169 (1974); Note, supra note 61.
67. 2 Wn. App. 845, 472 P.2d 589 (1970) (minority shareholder defrauded in
sale to majority shareholder with inside information).
68. id. at 857-58, 472 P.2d at 597.
69. 83 Wn. 2d 70, 515 P.2d 982 (1973). The transaction involved the sale of
stock in a nursing home which the seller had warranted was operated in accordance
with all government rules and regulations. In upholding the trial court's finding that
this warranty was not material, the Washington Supreme Court disregarded the formal
recital of reliance stated in the sale contract. The court commented that "[t he trial
court properly looked to the actual effect of the omission rather than the formal
declaration." Id. at 76, 515 P.2d at 985. But cf. Washington Nat'l Corp. v. Thomas,
570 P.2d 1268, 1275 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (reliance not an element of a cause of
action under the Arizona securities act).
70. 83 Wn. 2d at 75-76, 515 P.2d at 985; cf. Diversified Equities, Inc. v. Warren,
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,325 (Tenn. App. 1976) (reliance is an element of a
fraudulent practice under Tennessee securities law).
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Ernst v. Hochfelder,71 proof of scienter-"intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud" 72-is now a necessary element in an action brought
under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5. 73 The issue in Hochfelder was
whether an allegation of negligent conduct alone was sufficient to
state a claim under section 10(b). 74 The Court held that the statutory
language of section 10(b) indicated that scienter was required.7 5 Although the Court conceded that the language of rule 1Ob-5 could be
interpreted to encompass negligent as well as intentional conduct, it
concluded that the scope of the rule "cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under § 10(b). 7 6
Prior to Hochfelder, the Washington Court of Appeals, in Shermer
v. Baker, had followed federal case law in the Ninth Circuit interpreting rule 1Ob-5 and held that scienter was not a necessary element in a
civil action brought under R.C.W. § 21.20.010. 77 Even though proof
of scienter is now required under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5,78 it
does not necessarily follow that it is also required under the Washington Act. Two federal appellate courts have observed that state antifraud provisions similar to Washington's differ from section 10(b) in
79
that they require no showing of scienter whereas section 10(b) does.
71. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). For a detailed discussion of the facts of this case and
the lower court opinions, see, e.g., Goldwasser, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: An AntiLandmark Decision, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 29 (1976); 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 775
(1976); 10 GA. L. REV. 856 (1976); 29 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1976).
72. 425 U.S. at 193.
73. For a discussion of the future impact of Hochfelder, see Bucklo, The Supreme
Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule lOb-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29
STAN. L. REV. 213 (1977); Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A Critique and an
Evaluation of Its Impact upon the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 HASTINGS
L.J. 569 (1977). See note 78 infra.
74. 425 U.S. at 190. The seventh, eighth, and ninth circuit courts had each held
that negligence alone was sufficient. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634
(7th Cir. 1963); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 290 U.S.
951 (1968); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). The second and tenth
circuits, on the other hand, had held that "scienter" was necessary. See, e.g., Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975).
75. 425 U.S. at 193, 212. The Court focused on the words "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" from § 10(b). See note 18 supra.
76. 425 U.S. at 214.
77. 2 Wn. App. at 856, 472 P.2d at 589. The Washington court relied on Royal
Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962), and Ellis v. Carter.
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
78. Subsequent to Hochfelder, most lower federal courts have permitted actions
to be brought under § 10(b) without requiring a showing of specific intent to defraud.
See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1082 (D. Del. 1976) ("knowing
misconduct"); Neill v. David A. Noyes & Co., 416 F. Supp. 78, 82 (N.D. III. 1976)
("some form of scienter beyond mere negligence").
79. Cole v. Alodex Corp., 533 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1976); Nickels v. Koehler Man-
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Although a landmark decision such as Hochfelder is ordinarily persuasive authority in state courts, a strong argument can be made for
retaining the present Washington rule. Washington's antifraud
provision is patterned after rule lOb-5 and not section 10(b). 8 0 It does
not contain the language the Supreme Court relied upon in holding
scienter a necessary element in a section 10(b) action. 8 ' Consequently,
the Court's statutory analysis in Hochfelder ought not apply to an interpretation of R.C.W. § 21.20.010.
An analysis of the Washington antifraud provision indicates that all
types of conduct, ranging from innocent to intentional, are covered.
Separate criminal and civil liability provisions8 2 distinguish between
the actionable standards of care, and the only specific reference to
knowing or intentional conduct in the Washington Act is contained in
the section imposing criminal liability.8 3 In State v. Hynds,8 4 a criminal
action for violation of the antifraud provision, the Washington Supreme Court held that a wilful violation is required to establish criminal liability.8 5 The court went on to distinguish between civil and criminal liability and pointed out that, in criminal cases, "knowledge of
the falsity of the representations and specific intent to defraud must be
86
proven."
In contrast, under R.C.W. § 21.20.430, the civil liability provision,
purchasers, sellers, and offerors who violate R.C.W. § 21.20.010
are strictly liable to defrauded investors.8 7 The civil liability provision
agement Corp., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)

71,307 (6th Cir. 1976). See Erwin,

Securities Fraud and the Statute of Limitations: The Strange Case of the "Modified
Uniform" Securities Act, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 324, 342-43 (1976).
80. Compare the Washington antifraud provision, reproduced at note 16 supra,
with § 10(b), reproduced at note 18 supra, and rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5

(1977).
81.
82.

See note 75 supra.
WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.400 (1976) (criminal); id. § 21.20.430 (Supp. 1977)

(civil).
83. R.C.W. § 21.20.400 states: "Any person who wilfully violates any provision of
this chapter ....
or who wilfully violates any rule or order under this chapter,...
knowing the statement made to be false or misleading in any material respect, shall
upon conviction be fined . . .or imprisoned . . . or both .
WAsH. REV. CODE
§ 21.20.400 (1976).
84. 84 Wn. 2d 657, 529 P.2d 829 (1974).

85.

Id. at 663, 529 P.2d at 833.

86.

Id. In State v. Cox, 17 Wn. App. 896, 902-03, 566 P.2d 935, 939-40 (1977),

a criminal action for violation of R.C.W. § 21.20.010, the court similarly held that
intent to defraud is a necessary element to establish criminal liability under R.C.W.
§ 21.20.400, but not for a violation of R.C.W. § 21.20.010 alone. Cf. Washington
Nat'l Corp. v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 1268, 1275 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (knowledge of

fault not required to establish civil liability under Arizona securities act).
87. State v. Cox, 17 Wn. App. 896, 902, 566 P.2d 935, 938 (1977) (" [A] violation
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contains no requirement of knowledge or intent to defraud. In addition, subsection (3) spells out a negligence standard for limited thirdparty liability. 88 The absence of such a negligence standard for purchasers, sellers, and offerors is an additional indication of legislative intent
to impose strict liability on those parties. Finally, because the Washington Act contains separate express provisions for criminal and civil
liability-the former requiring knowing or intentional conduct and
the latter with no such requirement-one might also infer a legislative
intent to impose civil liability when no intent to defraud existed.
II.

COMMON LAW ACTIONS

A defrauded purchaser or seller who is satisfied with rescission as a
remedy should bring an action under the civil liability provision of the
Washington Act. 89 Under the Act, a plaintiff need establish only misrepresentation or omisson of a material fact and justifiable reliance
thereon. In addition, the statute provides for interest and attorneys'
fees. If rescission is an inadequate remedy, however, the defrauded
plaintiff may seek more complete relief in a common law suit for
damages, alleging either fraud or negligent misrepresentation. 90 A
claim of common law fraud requires a plaintiff to prove the elements
of fraud by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, 9 1 while an action
for negligent misrepresentation requires a plaintiff to establish the exof R.C.W. § 21.20.010 does not require a specific intent to defraud. The making of an
untrue statement is sufficient.") (emphasis added). In Ludwig v. Mutual Real Estate
Investors, 18 Wn. App. 33, 567 P.2d 658 (1977), although the court denied recovery
under the pre-amendment version of R.C.W. § 21.20.430, see note 25 supra, it did not
question the trial court's finding of a violation of R.C.W. § 21.20.010 in the absence
of a showing of intent to defraud. Similarly, in an action under the New Mexico
Securities Act, that state's court noted: "The intent with which the defendant makes
the statement is irrelevant under the terms of the statute. The statute requires only
that the statement made be false and material, or that the omission be of a material
fact necessary to make true the statement made." Treider v. Doherty & Co., 86 N.M.
735, 527 P.2d 498, 500 (Ct. App. 1974).
88. No Washington cases have interpreted the scope of third-party liability under
this section; however, it does not appear to extend to independent third parties, such
as accountants, unless they "materially aid" in the transaction and cannot prove that
they did not know, or should not have known of the facts producing liability. See notes
20 & 21 supra.
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430 (Supp. 1977); See Part I supra.
90. For example, a plaintiff who may have suffered significant consequential damages as a result of a fraudulent transaction may wish to retain the security and sue
for damages rather than settle for rescission.
91. See, e.g., Beckendorf v. Beckendorf, 76 Wn. 2d 457, 462, 457 P.2d 603, 606
(1969): Baertschi v. Jordan, 68 Wn. 2d 478, 483, 413 P.2d 657, 660 (1966).
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istence of a duty to act 92 and the defendant's failure to adhere to a
93
standard of due care.
The principal reason for bringing a common law action for fraud
or misrepresentation is to permit the plaintiff to affirm the transaction, retain the security or consideration received, and sue instead for
monetary damages. The "benefit of the bargain" rule is the appropriate measure of damages in an action for negligent misrepresentation
or common law fraud, 94 and is computed as the difference between
the value of the security as represented and its actual value at the time
of sale.95 In addition, an injured party may recover consequential
96
damages for the losses proximately caused by the defendant's acts.
Under such circumstances, this recovery could be considerably greater than would be permitted in an action for rescission under R.C.W. §
21.20.430. It should be noted, however, that attorneys' fees are not
usually recoverable in a common law action.
A.

Common Law Fraud

It is a well-settled rule in Washington that the essential elements of
a claim for fraud are (1) the representation of an existing fact, (2) its
materiality, (3) its falsity, (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or
ignorance of its truth, (5) his intent that it should be acted upon by the
person to whom it is made, (6) ignorance of its falsity on the part of
the person to whom it is made, (7) the latter's reliance on the truth of
the representation, (8) his right to rely on it, and (9) his consequent

92. See, e.g., Gordon v. Deer Park School Dist. No. 414, 71 Wn. 2d 119, 426 P.2d
824 (1967); Rose v. Nevitt, 56 Wn. 2d 882, 885, 355 P.2d 776, 777 (1960) (the duty

to exercise due care arises from the forseeability of the risk created).
93. See, e.g., Gordon v. Deer Park School Dist. No. 414, 71 Wn. 2d 119, 426
P.2d 824 (1967). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 59, at §§ 105-110 for a

discussion of misrepresentation.
94. See, e.g., Mclnnis & Co. v. Western Tractor & Equip. Co., 67 Wn. 2d 965, 967,
410 P.2d 908, 910 (1966); cf. Chapman v. Marketing Unlimited, Inc., 14 Wn. App.
34, 38, 539 P.2d 107, 110 (1975) ("benefit of bargain" rule is no different in a case

involving negligent misrepresentation than in a case of fraud).
95.

See, e.g., Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 70 Wn. 2d 915, 921, 425 P.2d 891,

895 (1967). Compare this measure of damages with the out-of-pocket (rescission)
measure under the Securities Act of Washington. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430 (Supp.
1977). See Garretson v. Red-Co, Inc., 9 Wn. App. 923, 928, 516 P.2d 1039, 1042
(1973), discussed at note 54 supra.

96. See, e.g., McInnis & Co. v. Western Tractor & Equip. Co., 67 Wn. 2d 965, 971,
410 P.2d 908, 912 (1966); Chapman v. Marketing Unlimited, Inc., 14 Wn. App. 34,
40-42, 539 P.2d 107, 111-12 (1975).
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damage. 97 The absence or failure to plead and prove any one of these
98
nine elements will be fatal to a plaintiffs claim.
99
While affirmative misrepresentations are clearly actionable,
Washington courts have held that mere silence, in the absence of a
duty to disclose, will not constitute fraud.100 In the past, a duty to disclose material facts has been found whenever a fiduciary relationship
existed' 01 or whenever one party had superior knowledge which was
unavailable to the other party who consequently relied on the fact that
all material facts had honestly been disclosed.' 0 2 The modem trend,
however, is to impose a duty to disclose material facts which are vital
and material to the transaction.' 0 3 Furthermore, in cases of securities
fraud, the Washington Court of Appeals has held that the antifraud
provision of the Securities Act of Washington "creates a form of fiduciary relationship"' 0 4 and sets a "statutory standard of honesty and
candor in direct dealings between individuals when the offer, sale or
purchase of a security is involved."' 10 5 This statutory duty to disclose
material facts in securities transactions, regardless of the expertise or
knowledge of either party, also should provide an applicable standard
06
of care in common law fraud actions.'
The materiality and reliance requirements of common law fraud
97. See, e.g., Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 70 Wn. 2d 915, 920, 425 P.2d 891,
895 (1967); Turner v. Enders, 15 Wn. App. 875, 878, 552 P.2d 694, 696 (1976) (securities fraud).
98. See, e.g., Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. McMahon, 53 Wn. 2d 51, 54, 330 P.2d
559, 561 (1958); Morgan v. Irving, 8 Wn. App. 354, 357, 506 P.2d 316, 318 (1973).
In Swanson v. Solomon, 50 Wn. 2d 825, 828, 314 P.2d 655, 657 (1957), the Washington Supreme Court stated that the same elements are necessary to establish fraud
in the sale of personal property or securities as in the sale of real property.
99. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, at § 106.
100. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Keene, 51 Wn. 2d 171, 174, 316 P.2d 899, 901 (1957)
(purchaser and seller on equal footing); accord, Simpson Timber Co. v. Palmberg
Const. Co., 377 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1967) (diversity action interpreting Washington law).
101. E.g., Burien Motors, Inc., v. Balch, 9 Wn. App. 573, 576-77, 513 P.2d 582,
585-86 (1973); accord, Hilton v. Mumaw, 522 F.2d 588, 597 (9th Cir. 1975)
(securities fraud).
102. E.g., Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 70 Wn. 2d 915, 918-19, 425 P.2d 891,
894 (1967); Turner v. Enders, 15 Wn. App. 875, 879, 552 P.2d 694, 697 (1976).
103. Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wn. App. 220, 222, 491 P.2d 1312, 1314 (1971) (rescission of real estate contract permitted for failure to disclose known land fill).
104. Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wn. App. 845, 853, 472 P.2d 589, 595 (1970).
105. Kaas v. Privette, 12 Wn. App. 142, 150, 529 P.2d 23, 29 (1974). Cf. Washington Nat'l Corp. v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 1268, 1275 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) ("statute
imposes an affirmative duty not to mislead").
106. See W. PROSSER, supra note 59, at § 36; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 285, 286 (1965). This statutory duty should apply in actions for negligent misrepresentation as well. See text accompanying notes 118 & 119 infra.
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are similar to those under the antifraud provision of the Washington
Act. 107 The elements of knowledge on the part of the defendant and
08
his related intent to defraud, however, are additional requirements,
similar, but not identical, to the showing of scienter now required in
actions under rule lOb-5 and section 10(b).1 09 If investors are defrauded while purchasing or selling securities in face-to-face transactions in which privity exists, the nine elements of common law
fraud--especially intent to defraud and corresponding reliance-are
not difficult to establish. If, however, securities are traded in an impersonal market in which buyers and sellers do not meet face to face,
difficulties of proof are greatly enhanced.
B.

Negligent Misrepresentation

An action for negligent misrepresentation is based upon negligence
and not upon fraud," 0 and arises when the defendant breaches a duty
to exercise reasonable care in disclosing material facts relevant to a
securities transaction."' Although there are no Washington cases in-

volving securities transactions in which an action for negligent misrepresentation has been maintained," 2 in J & J Food Centers, Inc. v.
Selig," 3 a case involving the sale of real property, the Washington Su107. See, e.g., Turner v. Enders, 15 Wn. App. 875, 878-79, 552 P.2d 694, 696-97
(1976) (common law fraud); Kaas v. Privette, 12 Wn. App. 142, 145-49, 529 P.2d
23, 26-28 (1974) (Washington Act); Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wn. App. 845, 856 n.6,
472 P.2d 589, 596 n.6 (1970) (Washington Act). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 59,
at § 108.
108. Turner v. Enders, 15 Wn. App. 875, 552 P.2d 694 (1976); W. PROSSER,
supra note 59, § 107, at 700-04.
109. See note 78 supra. Washington courts have held that it is enough if a defendant misrepresented facts without knowing whether his statements were true or
false. See, e.g., Alexander Myers & Co. v. Hopke, 88 Wn. 2d 449, 454, 565 P.2d 80,
83 (1977).
110. J & J Food Centers, Inc. v. Selig, 76 Wn. 2d 304, 311, 456 P.2d 691, 695
(1969) (false statements regarding a lease deposit and made to induce a sale constituted actionable negligence); Brown v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 53 Wn. 2d 142, 150,
332 P.2d 228, 233 (1958) (false statements by a real estate broker, although not
fraudulent, may be negligent and therefore actionable).
I 11. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 107, at 706. For a discussion of the elements
of an action for negligent misrepresentation, see Goodhart, Liability for Innocent but
Negligent Misrepresentation,74 YALE LJ. 286 (1964).
112. The possibility of recovery under a theory of negligent misrepresentation
was ignored in Ludwig v. Mutual Real Estate Investors, 18 Wn. App. 33, 567 P.2d
658 (1977). See note 25 supra. The court denied civil liability under the prior version
of R.C.W. § 21.20.430 without a showing of common law fraud.
113. 76 Wn. 2d 304, 456 P.2d 691 (1969) (false statements regarding a lease
deposit in a sale of real property).
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preme Court stated: "The elements of the action are false statements,
made to induce a sale, which are relied on by the person asserting
damages, and which that person may justifiably rely upon. As the
measure of fault is negligence, the measure of justification is ordinary
11 4
care."
An action for negligent misrepresentation requires no showing of intent to defraud or reckless behavior; 1 5 privity of contract need not
exist; 116 and, once a duty to exercise due care is established, a negligence standard applies. 1 7 Because the Securities Act of Washington
has been held to establish a statutory duty to act with honesty and
candor in securities dealings, l" 8 an action for negligent misrepresentation should be appropriate when this duty has been breached. 119
III.

CONCLUSION

Because most cases of securities fraud have been initiated in federal
courts under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5, only a skeleton of case law
exists under the antifraud and civil liability provisions of the Securities Act of Washington. With the recent developments in federal case
law 20 and amendments to the civil liability provision in the Washington Act, 12 1 litigation in state courts has become an attractive
alternative in spite of the uncertainty created by the lack of judicial
interpretation of the Act.' 22 Because a claim may be easier to estab114. !d.at3ll,456P.2dat695.
115. See, e.g., id. at 3 11, 456 P.2d at 695. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note
59, § 107, at 706.
116. See W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 107, at 706-07 (commenting on the problem of limiting liability where human words "are capable of being repeated and
passed on indefinitely").

117. Because this is an action for negligence, some courts have held that a defense
of contributory negligence is available to the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff was not justified in relying on the defendant's statements. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 59, § 107, at 716. In Washington, however, the defense of contributory negligence
no longer is a bar to recovery. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010 (1976).
118. Kaas v. Privette, 12 Wn. App. 142, 150, 529 P.2d 23, 29 (1974); see notes
104-06 and accompanying text supra.
119. See W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 107, at 709; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 285, 286 (1965).
120. See note 3 supra.
121. See note 4 supra.
122. Three commentators recognized the possibility of an increase in forum shopping in cases of securities fraud as a result of Hoc hfelder. See Goldwasser, Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder: An Anti-Landmark Decision, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 29. 49-52
(1976); Comment, The Securities Act of Nebraska: An Overview, 56 NEB. L. REV.
836, 859 (1977); 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 962, 971 (1976).

298

Blue Sky Fraud
lish in state court under the Washington Act, plaintiffs in Washington
no longer need go to federal court to seek relief under section 10(b).
Furthermore, if a plaintiff wishes damages and not rescission, a claim
for negligent misrepresentation or fraud should be no more difficult
to establish than a claim under section 10(b).
In the past, civil actions brought under the antifraud and civil liability provisions of the Securities Act of Washington have involved
only face-to-face transactions. 23 In the future, more complex securities fraud litigation involving marketplace transactions can be expected to shift to state courts now that the scope of liability under section
10(b) has been limited. Although the Supreme Court's actions to limit
the scope of liability under the 1934 Act may be viewed with alarm by
some, the opportunity now exists for state courts to enter the field and
make a significant contribution to investor protection under state law.
Sally H. Clarke

123.

No appellate cases exist under the Washington Act involving a general fraud

on the securities market. In every case under the Washington Act, either privity did
exist between the plaintiff and defendant, e.g., Clausing v. DeHart, 83 Wn. 2d 70,

515 P.2d 982 (1973), or the defendant had made statements to the plaintiff to induce
the purchase, e.g., Kaas v. Privette, 12 Wn. App. 142, 529 P.2d 23 (1974).
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